Almost every corner of the political spectrum has attempted to justify its views by invoking the theory of natural rights at some point. By “natural”, what is meant is that these rights not only confer an entitlement to perform or refrain from certain specified actions, but they are also claimed to be both universal and inalienable. This is a key distinction from their counterparts, legal rights, which serve the same basic function as natural rights, except they deny the universality, and instead acknowledge that only people who are citizens of the government which grants these rights are entitled to them.
The two schools of rights have been at odds with one another for centuries. Originating in their most primitive from within ancient Islamic law, natural rights were revived by the great enlightenment philosophers Locke and Hobbes, who fleshed out their definition with a series of theological arguments. The central theme of all Lockean conceptions of natural rights, the idea of universal inalienability, is crucial because when one accepts that rights possess these properties, they also must accept that rights are intrinsic to all people, regardless of their race, nationality, location, situation, and so on. Be aware that natural rights are not spoken of in an abstract way, proponents believe they exist objectively, as much a part of the real world as anything else.
But how do rights relate to the white nationalist movement? Over the years, in the many arguments and debates which I’ve observed and participated in related to nationalism, one of the most common arguments stated from both sides will take the approximation of “yes, but people have a right to free movement between countries”, and conversely “yes, but people have a right to live among their own people.” When we look at how philosophers, the media, and various international bodies have elevated natural rights to their current position, it’s not at all surprising. However, it is my intention to argue that natural rights are in fact part of a flawed philosophy which, when placed under the slightest scrutiny, is revealed to be entirely vacuous – they just don’t exist. Indeed, I lose a great deal of confidence in the Jewish and liberal composed political elite who perpetuate these falsehoods, because to do so demonstrates either a gross ignorance of the topic, or a deliberate attempt to subvert the public with what is yet another damned lie.
Certainly a large portion of their popularity stems from the fact that, when considered simplistically, they do sound like a grandiose and advantageous property to claim that humans have. The US Declaration of Independence speaks of natural rights to “life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness”, the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (EU) lists dozens of rights, including “liberty, privacy, marriage, thought, expression” and so on. In the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the United Nations (UN) also sanctifies “the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion” and states that “everyone has the right to own property alone as well as in association with others.” It all has such a pleasant ring to it, and with such powerful organizations backing the natural rights theory, there must be compelling justifications for why these rights even exist at all, surely?
Well, the man who popularized them, Locke, saw God as the ultimate source and foundation of natural rights. In Concerning Civil Government, published in 1689, he explains that the first rights which can be proven to exist are the ones to health and liberty. According to Locke, because humans are the creation of God, we are His property, and it therefore follows that any attempt to damage or enslave another human is like trying to commit theft from God Himself. This would contravene the natural order of creation, and so it follows that we must naturally have the rights to health and liberty. He then continues, and explains that by virtue of having God-given free will to control the body, the human mind logically has ownership of the body as a kind of possession. By working on material objects, be them stone, wood, metal, or anything else, man can be said to have “mixed his labor” with the objects, literally spreading the ownership of his body onto the world around him. Because man has taken a useless object and crafted it to his own specification, and in doing so expended some of his time and energy (which we have already established are both his “property”), the object ceases to be independent of him, becoming like an extension of his own body, in other words his own property. This is Locke’s demonstration of the third natural right which is evident from creation, the right to property.
For an atheist, these justifications won’t be the least bit compelling, and secular attempts at proving the existence of natural rights have also been made for this very reason. The American philosopher Gewirth coined the term “rights-conferring properties”, these being aspects of human nature that he thought demanded the recognition of rights. Gewirth picked these rights-conferring properties based on how essential they are to being human, for example, autonomy is an important part of what we feel defines a human’s life, and for this reason it is a strong rights conferring property. Gewirth also includes reason, free choice and interests as other examples strong rights conferring properties. He then proceeds to define empirical conditions that are needed in order to exercise our rights conferring properties. “Not being enslaved” is a good condition which is needed for autonomy to be exercised, and because being enslaved limits our autonomy, he says we have a right not to be enslaved against our consent, because it would mean we cannot perform these actions that are essential to being human.
These types of philosophical arguments may seem so distant from our modern discourse in which the word “rights” is thrown about with relative impunity, but it really is from antiquated arguments like this and Locke’s that natural rights have come to establish themselves in their present form in our society, being passed down from the enlightenment to modern day just like other theories of law, theology, and countless other subjects. However, there hasn’t always been a near-complete lack of criticism of natural rights theories, indeed, that seems to be a much more recent phenomenon.
In 1816, an essay entitled Anarchical Fallacies was published by the influential utilitarian philosopher Bentham. Its purpose was to once and for all refute the Lockean concept of natural rights by showing the inherent contradictions involved in their definitions. Bentham has a passionate writing style, and in the essay he frequently launches tirades of condemnation towards natural rights theory, famously describing them as “nonsense on stilts.” Alongside these entertaining interludes, though, are several powerful critiques, and the first right to be questioned is that of liberty.
In Locke’s works, he never provided any detail or exception to the right to liberty, and as a consequence the USA, EU and UN, in their adoption of natural rights, have all neglected this too. All declarations of the right to liberty espoused by these organizations provide no extra detail of the right; they merely state a single word, “liberty”. Readers can only interpret the word “liberty” in its most literal sense, that is, unrestricted freedom. However a contradiction becomes obvious here, because if all people have the universal and inalienable right to freedom, then does that not mean that one person has the naturally-given freedom to kill another? The murderer could quite simply justify his actions by making a claim to the right of liberty, specifically “the liberty to be able to kill another person.” If that were the case, though, it would result in the restriction of the naturally-given freedom of the victim, who also has a right to liberty. The victim, with equal validity, may claim that it is his right to liberty not to be killed – a completely paradoxical situation. Bentham continues by pointing out that even if we attempt to reconcile this problem by outlining certain restrictions to the right to liberty by rephrasing it to, for example, “you have the right to liberty, provided you do not kill, steal, […]” the original intention of absoluteness quickly fades, up until the point that the once “natural” right is entirely resemblant of a legal right. And the question is, if we already have laws which serve the purpose of the natural right, what is the point in having the natural right at all?
Next to be scrutinized is the right to property. Once again, no mention is given to any limits that may exist to this right, it’s stated alone in an equally vague manner as the right to liberty. Taken at its strictest literal definition (as this is all we have been given), it appears that this right has given an absolute right to property, with no restriction. Of course then, it follows that in any situation where someone may attempt to take a possession away from us, we may justifiably decline. Any tax, payment, or other situation where we might lose a portion of our wealth is rendered useless, because our right to property entirely permits the individual to not have his property taken from him without exception. This absurdity can be taken even further, because as every individual in the world supposedly has this right, all people may excusably claim ownership of everything, leaving us in a state of complete anarchy. The anarchical fallacy produced here is so contrary to the original intention of Locke, that what was supposed to be a promotion of the concept of property has simultaneously acted as a catalyst for destroying it outright. As with liberty, any attempt to reconcile the right to property involves a lengthy series of exceptions to the right to be included in its definition, to the point where it becomes more of a man-made law, subject very much to the circumstances involved, than a revered universal and inalienable right.
Not being content with just disproving theological natural rights theories, philosophers have also pointed out the logical error in Gewirth’s secular argument. The crux of the most responses is that during Gewirth’s reasoning, he makes a hidden (and false) assumption. Rights conferring properties may safely be defined, however to make the jump saying “because we have rights conferring properties, we do have rights” is an illogical one that doesn’t follow. This type of problem is so commonplace in philosophy that it has its own name; Hume’s Guillotine, or the is-ought problem. In essence, because we have rights conferring properties, it only follows that we ought to have rights, not that we actually do have them in an existential way. This is perfect ground for legal rights to step in if the law so wishes, but once again leaves natural rights theories off-limits.
I now hope it is clear is natural rights have been shown to be incoherent. The consequences of this are numerous, and I believe they’re vitally important – it removes a justification from both liberals and nationalists when they make claims about many areas of politics, although certainly it’s the former that’s left worse off. Much egalitarian thought has been based on natural rights theory; the appeal being that these rights are equally held by all members of species, rather than only to certain groups. Charities like Amnesty International encourage the west to donate huge sums of money to protect the “rights” of people living in third world countries, and the liberals listen to them and comply. Mass immigration is defended with cries of “it’s their right to come here!” Scientific claims about race are silenced due to the violation of the “right not to be discriminated against.” All of these present ever increasing obstacles to the continued survival of the white race.
If white nationalism is to gain the credibility of a wider audience, an intellectual image for it has to replace current perceptions of skin-headed thugs, and this can be facilitated in part by the rational rejection of natural rights. It is one among many other issues that white nationalists can use to demonstrate their pursuit of progress, not hatred, and I hope that the reader will lend support to this vision in the continual effort to expose the bankruptcy of liberal thought.
This whole discourse highlights more than just an isolated disagreement between what philosophy has shown to be false and what western liberal policy embraces, however. This shows, along with countless other exposés of the political orthodoxy, the overall asinine and inane foundation on which much of their thought rests – lies built upon unquestionable lies, nothing more than “nonsense on stilts”, to quote Bentham’s description, as true in 1816 as it is today.
 John Locke, The Two Treatises of Civil Government, Hollis ed., (1689)
 Alan Gewirth, Human Rights: Essays on Justification and Applications, (Chicago; University of Chicago Press, 1982)
 Jeremy Bentham, Anarchical Fallacies, Bowring ed., vol. 2, (1843)
 David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, (1739)