For those who are unfamiliar with these people, Ronald Brownstein and Stanley Greenberg are two of the Democratic Party’s top Jews.
Look at it this way: the White working class vote is a hole for Democrats. They have to fill that hole due to their unpopularity with that group by making up for it with other parts of the electorate. The problem is that the growing margins expand the width of the hole and turnout expands the depth of the hole. It is becoming an insurmountable challenge due to Wokeism which is activating non-evangelical White working class voters. It is also repulsive to working class “Latinx” male voters.
“White voters without four-year college degrees functioned as the brawny backbone of the Democrats’ “New Deal” electoral coalition from the 1930s through the 1960s. The party’s erosion with those voters after that, largely around issues of racial equity and cultural change, generated enormous alarm and internal debate during the 1970s and especially 1980s: The centrist “New Democrat” movement led by Bill Clinton was sparked mostly by the desire to win back more blue-collar and rural Whites.
From roughly 1992 through 2008, Democrats settled into a sustainable equilibrium with these voters. In national exit polls over that period, Democratic presidential candidates consistently won only about two-fifths of them, but they typically captured significantly higher percentages in the key Rust Belt battleground states (such as Michigan, Wisconsin and Pennsylvania). Over this period, Democrats were able to overcome their deficits with working-class Whites in the Rust Belt and beyond by maximizing their performance among college-educated White voters and people of color, both of whom were growing as a share of the electorate, while blue-collar Whites were shrinking nationally on average about 2 to 3 percentage points every four years. (Those working-class Whites have fallen from about 52% of all voters in 2004 to just under 40% last year, according to census results.)
But since 2012, Democrats’ position with these working-class White voters has slipped further, in a manner that has grown more difficult to overcome with improved performance and turnout among other groups, especially in less diverse industrial battlegrounds. The Democrats’ national vote share among them fell to a little over one-third in President Barack Obama’s 2012 election before cratering to just below 30%, according to multiple data sources, in Donald Trump’s 2016 victory over Hillary Clinton; as important, Trump erased enough of the Democratic blue-collar overperformance in Michigan, Wisconsin and Pennsylvania to capture all three states and squeak out his Electoral College win while losing the national popular vote.
In 2020, Democrats slightly recovered among non-college-educated White voters, with Biden winning about one-third of them nationally and recapturing just enough to help flip back the three pivotal Rust Belt states that had keyed Trump’s win. But the 2020 results opened a new vein of anxiety for Democrats, with some evidence that Trump had gained among working-class Hispanic voters, too, especially men.
Last week’s results triggered new Democratic alarms about the trends with these non-college and non-urban voters, particularly Whites. Youngkin pushed his vote share past 80% in multiple rural southwestern Virginia counties and captured fully 76% of all non-college Whites statewide, according to the exit poll conducted by Edison Research for a consortium of media organizations including CNN. Close to three-fourths of those non-college Whites disapproved of Biden’s job performance, according to results provided by the CNN polling unit.
In part, Youngkin ran so well with non-college-educated Whites in Virginia because half of them identified as evangelical Christians, a devoutly Republican constituency: Youngkin carried more than 9 in 10 of those White evangelicals without college degrees, the CNN polling unit found in previously unreported results. That’s a common deficit for Democrats across the South, where evangelicals compose a relatively larger share of the working-class White population and often vote for Republicans in such overwhelming proportions.
More ominous for Democrats was the Virginia outcome among the half of non-college White voters there who are not evangelicals — a group that is more populous in the key Rust Belt battlegrounds. In 2018, the exit polls found that Democrats carried a majority of those voters in House races nationwide; in 2020, the exit polls and other post-election analyses found that Biden won 42% to 45% of them. But Youngkin last week carried fully 65% of them, holding McAuliffe to just 35%, a result that presages ominous losses for Democrats across the Midwest if it holds through the midterm elections. …”
“Democrats begin weak on crime, immigration, the economy, who is best on jobs and wages, losing to Trump on who is better at delivering for the forgotten Americans. …
Our strongest attack on Republicans: they gave big corporations big tax cuts to the rich and working people saw nothing. Still trickle down for them. And they threaten the big middle class tax cut, the child tax credit. Their repealing it will raise taxes on working families and push many into poverty. Both are strong, as CTC has become a base and persuasion targets message …”
I don’t think anyone else follows and reads these people.
I do it because I enjoy mocking them and watching their growing anxiety.
Right now, blue collar and middle class workers think that Blumpf was a better president than Biden.